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Abstract: Callender and Cohen (2006) argue that there is no need for a special account of the 
constitution of scientific representation. I argue that scientific representation is communal 
and therefore deeply tied to the practice in which it is embedded. The communal nature is 
accounted for by licensing, the activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish a 
representation. A case study of the Lotka-Volterra model reveals how the licensure is a 
constitutive element of the representational relationship. Thus, any account of the 
constitution of scientific representation must account for licensing, meaning that there is a 
special problem of scientific representation.  
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to many philosophers of science, representation in scientific practice is different 
from representation in other disciplines, like art and language. This claim is denied by Craig 
Callender and Jonathan Cohen (2006), who argue that representation is the same across 
disciplines. In this paper, I will argue that their view leaves the communal nature of scientific 
representation unexplained. To explain why scientific representation is dependent upon 
practice, I will introduce the concept of licensing, in which the targets of representational 
vehicles are determined through various activities performed by scientists in accord with 
broader scientific practice. I will argue that licensure is a constitutive feature of 
representation in science, indicating that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
2. Callender and Cohen’s View 
On Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, much of the literature on scientific representation has 
been “concerned with non-issues” (2006, 67). Specifically, they think there is no reason for 
philosophers of science to give a special account of the “constitution question:” “What 
constitutes the representational relation between a model and the world?” (2006, 68). In 
response to this question, they make a few observations. One is that it is “economical and 
natural to explain some types of representation in terms of other, more basic types of 
representation” (2006, 70). They also identify a general desire to have a consistent account of 
how “entities other than models—language, pictures, mental states, and so on—…represent 
the very same targets that models represent” (2006, 71). For these reasons, they suggest that  
 
 
“scientific representation is just one more special case of derivative representation” (2006, 
75). That is to say that the representational nature of scientific vehicles is explained in the 
same way that the representational nature of linguistic entities, artwork, etc. is explained. In 
each case, and in every practice, the representational nature in question will be reduced to a 
more fundamental representational entity. So, e.g., the representational nature of a word, a 
painting, and a scientific model will each be explained in terms of the representational nature 
of mental states.  
On Callender and Cohen’s view, representation is purely stipulative: “virtually 
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually 
anything…” (2006, 74). Of course, it is not the case that any stipulated representation will 
actually be useful for scientific aims. Thus, they identify pragmatic constraints which delimit 
scientific representation. However, they make it quite clear that these constraints are 
delimiting already-existing representations. As such, the pragmatic constraints are not a part 
of an account of the constitution of representation itself: “the questions about the utility of 
these representational vehicles are questions about the pragmatics of things that are 
representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status per se” (2006, 75). 
 If Callender and Cohen are correct, then we are left rethinking a rather extensive 
literature on scientific representation which typically begins with the assumption that there is 
 
 
something special about representation in science.
1
 As one example among many, Mauricio 
Suárez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. His account 
takes careful notice of the aims of scientific practice, noting that mere stipulation (what he 
calls “representational force”) is insufficient for representation in science. To be a scientific 
representation, a vehicle must also permit surrogate reasoning which “allows competent and 
informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding [a target]” (2004, 773). If we accept 
Callender and Cohen’s view, then Suárez’s account and the many others like it do nothing 
more than identify some of the typical pragmatic strategies employed in delimiting 
representations for scientific uses (Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).  
3. Private Reminiscence and Communal Representation 
In order to show that the extensive literature on scientific representation has not been 
addressing a non-issue, I will need to show that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation, a feature unexplained by Callender and Cohen’s account. I submit that the 
relevant feature in need of special explanation is the communal nature of scientific 
representation, that it inherently involves reference to the practice. To see why Callender and 
                                               
1
 For more accounts which answer the constitution question in a distinct way, see the work of 
Ronald Giere (1988, 2004), Bas van Fraassen (1980, 2008), RIG Hughes (1997), Steven 
French, James Ladyman, and Otávio Bueno (French and Ladyman 1999; Bueno and French 
2011), and Gabriele Contessa (2007). For an overview of these accounts of scientific 
representation among others, see Brandon Boesch (2015) and Mauricio Suárez (2015).  
 
 
Cohen’s view is unable to account for the communal nature of scientific representation, 
consider what I call ‘reminiscence’, a representational relationship which lacks the same 
communal feature. It is defined schematically as the following:
2
 
Some X is reminiscent of some Y for some agent A provided that when A 
thinks about or experiences X, she thinks about or experiences Y and 
attributes some connection between X and Y.  
So, for example, a drawing can be reminiscent of my nephew, the smell of honeysuckle can 
be reminiscent of golfing, etc.  
 There are three noteworthy features of reminiscence. First, the representational nature 
of reminiscence can be reduced to the representational nature of more fundamental entities. 
For example, I can explain the drawing’s reminiscence of my nephew in virtue of the mental 
state produced by the drawing (which is about my nephew, who created it). Second, 
stipulation is sufficient to create an instance of reminiscence. For example, I could draw a 
symbol on my hand which I create for the sake of reminding me to buy bread from the store. 
The reminiscent relationship exists because of my stipulative act.  Finally, any limitations of 
reminiscent relationships will be made for pragmatic reasons. For example, it would be for 
pragmatic reasons that I make the symbol on my hand look like a loaf of bread.  
                                               
2
 I should note that the account of reminiscence here is not meant as a detailed explanation of 
this concept, but only as an analogy to draw a point about representation.  
 
 
 These three features of reminiscence are noteworthy because they are shared by 
Callender and Cohen’s view of scientific representation. In fact, from Callender and Cohen’s 
perspective, the only major difference between the two concepts would be the particular aims 
for which each relationship is utilized. While important, these different aims alone are 
insufficient to explain a key dissimilarity between scientific representation and reminiscence: 
while reminiscence can be private, scientific representation is necessarily communal. That 
reminiscence can be private can be seen from the fact that discussions of reminiscence can 
terminate in disagreement. For example, no one is ultimately ‘correct’ about whether or not 
someone is reminiscent of someone else. This is because reminiscence is agent-relative and 
so depends only upon some particular agent and her mental states.  
 Scientific representation relies on much more. As Suárez has argued, “representation 
is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular agent. It is rather ‘in the world’, and more 
particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by 
those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (2010, 99). 
Scientific representation is not isolated from the practice in which it is embedded. It is 
necessarily communal.
3
  The communal nature is demonstrated from the fact that 
representational vehicles demonstrate autonomy from individual scientists and their mental 
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 The view of representation argued for in this paper echoes many of the points made by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s in his ‘Private Language Argument’ where he argues that meaning is 
necessarily communal (1953/2009, 95
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states.
4
 For example, a scientist’s rogue stipulation that the Lotka-Volterra model (which 
represents predator-prey relations) represents population change due to genetic drift does not 
count as an instance of scientific representation. This is not only because it does not 
(pragmatically) allow for meaningful insights, but also because it ignores and discounts the 
autonomous elements of the model as understood by the broader scientific community.
5
 The 
autonomous elements are seen in the materiality or historicity of the representational vehicle; 
in its development, reception, and contemporary use. Understanding how and why the 
scientific object represents its target requires paying attention to these communal features. 
That is to say that the communal nature is partially constitutive of the representational 
relationship. Callender and Cohen’s account of scientific representation does not sufficiently 
account for these constitutive communal elements, as will be shown more explicitly below. 
4. Licensing 
Explaining the communal nature of scientific representation requires that attention be given 
to the material, autonomous dimensions of the representational vehicle in terms of its 
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 This point has already been made specifically with regard to models by Morrison and 
Morgan (1999). Here, I am extending a similar point to other representational vehicles,  
including things like diagrams and figures.  
5
 Of course, there may be disagreements and developments internal to the practice about how 
to use some representation, but these disagreements and developments are part of the 
practice.  
 
 
development, reception, and use. All of these features partially establish a scientific 
representation, through an activity I call licensing. Licensing is the set of activities of 
scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational relationship between a 
vehicle and its target. It is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship: it 
is a critical part in explaining how and why some vehicle represents its target. Seeing the 
sorts of activities involved in licensing and how they partially constitute the representational 
relationship will require that we pay close attention to the historical development, reception, 
and use of actual instances of scientific representation.  
4.1 Licensing in Artistic Representation 
A similar sort of licensing is present in representation in art, and so an initial pass on 
the concept as it applies to artistic practice will be helpful to draw an analogy to licensing in 
science.
6
 To see the role of licensing in artistic representation, consider an example. The 
mere stipulation that Pablo Picasso’s Guernica should represent the pain of cyberbullying is 
clearly insufficient to make it represent this target. Understanding how Guernica is 
representational involves an awareness of communal features: Picasso’s intentions within the 
environment in which he created the painting, how the painting was received by viewers in 
the years following its creation, and how it is understood today. With these features in mind, 
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 It is somewhat contentious to draw conclusions about the nature of representation in science 
by appeal to art; see e.g. Bueno and French (2011). Nonetheless, it is a common technique in 
discussions of scientific representation; see e.g. Suárez (2004).  
 
 
it is clear that Guernica represents the pain and suffering of the people of Guernica who had 
been bombed by axis forces at the request of Francisco Franco and the Spanish Nationalists. 
The licensing here is a constitutive element of Guernica’s representational nature: without 
these features, it is not clear whether or how the painting would manage to represent anything 
at all. 
 Licensing also occurs outside of the scope of authorial intent, when the artistic 
community comes to accept that a piece of art is representational in a way that was not 
intended by the author. A good example can be taken from an anecdote related by the author 
Flannery O’Connor: 
[A] student asked me…: “Miss O’Connor, what is the significance of the 
Misfit’s hat?” Of course, I had no idea the Misfit’s hat was significant, but 
finally I managed to say, “Its significance is to cover his head.” (1988, 853) 
The Misfit is a key character in O’Connor’s famous short story, “A Good Man is Hard to 
Find,” and, as such, it would not be surprising for his wardrobe to be importantly 
representational. Her answer indicates that while she did not intend any representational 
target for the hat, there may yet be one. If the hat is representational, it will not be due to her 
authorial intent, but rather due to the views of the broader artistic community. 
 Let me make it very clear that the licensure so far described is not already accounted 
for by elements of Callender and Cohen’s account. First, notice that none of these means of 
licensing is a mere pragmatic limitation of already existing representations. It is not as if 
Guernica represents anything and everything, but is then limited by the contexts of Picasso, 
 
 
audiences, and art historians. These contexts are a crucial part of understanding why it 
represents at all. Nor is the licensing mere stipulation. O’Connor leaves it open that there 
may be a representational target for the Misfit’s hat, even though she did not stipulate one. A 
single reader’s stipulation alone is insufficient to make it a representation, since the target 
must also fit well with the Misfit’s characteristics, with O’Connor’s general themes as 
understood by literary critics and audiences alike, and so on. Once again, these contexts are a 
critical part of establishing the representational nature of the hat. 
4.2 Licensing in Scientific Representation: A Case Study 
The unique aims of science indicate that the licensing of scientific representation is of a 
different kind than the licensing in art. All the same, licensing similarly plays a critical role in 
establishing scientific representation. According to Tarja Knuuttila, case studies of scientific 
representation have revealed that it is “a complicated phenomenon” and “a laborious art” 
(2014, 304).  Understanding the nature of licensing and its role in the complexities of 
scientific representation will be best accomplished by examining the complicated features 
seen in the context of a case study. Examples could be made of any type of representational 
vehicle, like the masterful case study of a scientific figure made by Bruno Latour (1999).  I 
will take as my example the Lotka-Volterra model, since its development exhibits interesting 
features, many of which have already been widely discussed by other philosophers (e.g. 
Knuuttila and Loettgers 2011, forthcoming).  
 As mentioned above, the Lotka-Volterra model is used by ecologists to represent 
predator-prey relations. It had its beginnings in the independent work of two different 
 
 
scientists, Vito Volterra and Alfred Lotka. In understanding the representational nature of 
this model, it is important to pay attention to the licensing through its historical development. 
This attention includes noticing things like the way that the construction of the model by 
Lotka, Volterra, and others has been responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims. 
These historical and practice-centered features of the model’s development reveal the partial 
autonomy of its representational nature. These features constitute the licensing which is itself 
partially constitutive of the representational nature of the model since understanding how and 
why the model represents its targets requires attending to these features. Let us now turn to 
examine these features in more detail. 
 Consider first the development of the model by Volterra, who was “motivated by the 
goal of reproducing the kind of oscillating behavior that was observed empirically in fishery 
statistics” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 19). His aim to address a theoretical 
question with an empirically useful model is central not only to understanding how the model 
historically came about, but in understanding how it represents its targets. Consider how 
Volterra described his project and the aims which permeate his description:  
Let us seek to express in words the way the phenomenon proceeds roughly: 
afterwards let us translate these words into mathematical language. This leads 
to the formulation of differential equations. If then we allow ourselves to be 
guided by the methods of analysis we are led much farther than the language 
and ordinary reasoning would be able to carry us and can formulate precise 
mathematical laws. These do not contradict the results of observation. Rather 
 
 
the most important of these seems in perfect accord with the statistical results. 
(1928, 5)  
Volterra’s actual process of moving from words, to equation, to application of results (for 
both theoretical and empirical purposes) first involved creating an equation to account for the 
population change of a single species. He then added additional species and modelled 
interactions under different conditions, including, notably, contending for the same food and 
the predation of one species upon the other. Using these models, he demonstrated “three 
fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species living together” (1928, 20). He then 
applied these theoretical laws of predator-prey relations to the empirical case which had 
prompted his analysis, the peculiar rise in predator populations during the decrease of fishing 
of prey populations in the Adriatic Sea during World War I (1928, 21).  
Why does Volterra’s model represent these theoretical features of predator-prey 
relations? Why does it represent the populations of fish in the Adriatic during World War I? 
It represents these targets because, through a series of steps of analysis, revision, and 
development, each of which was responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims 
understood and described in his account, Volterra established this representational nature. 
Indeed, as explained by Knuuttila and Loettgers (forthcoming), the historical development of 
this model has a much more extended history than the one Volterra described in the two 
papers where he first introduced it (1926, 1928). The model is a representation of its target 
not by mere stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but through careful and attentive 
construction of equations which ensure that the model functions in the wider theoretical 
 
 
contexts and can explain the relevant empirical aims. In short, the model represents its targets 
because Volterra so licensed it by building into the model these external, autonomous 
representational features. Without these features, how or what would it represent? 
Consider another instance of licensing in the development of the Lotka-Volterra 
model, this time by Lotka. His development proceeded with a different aim than Volterra: 
“instead of starting from the different simple cases and generalizing from them, he developed 
a highly abstract and general model template that could be applied in modelling various kinds 
of systems” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 13). He began by creating a very general 
equation which described “evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among the 
several components…of the system” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 15). In two 
papers (1920a, 1920b), Lotka applied this general equation to particular cases in biology and 
chemistry, in each case coming to theoretical conclusions about the systems in question. For 
example, in applying the equation to a predator-prey system, he concluded that there would 
be “undamped oscillation continuing indefinitely” among the two populations (1920a, 414). 
Lotka did not specifically apply the results to any empirical data, but instead used his results 
to come to theoretical conclusions about these relationships which he then connected to 
theoretical ecological principles drawn from Herbert Spencer’s First Principles (1920a, 414).  
 Why does Lotka’s model represent its theoretical target? What constitutes this 
representational relationship? Any attempt to explain the representational relationship must 
reference the way in which Lotka derived his general equation and the way in which he 
applies it to the specific cases. That is to say, the representational nature of the model is 
 
 
constructed through the scientific activities performed by Lotka during the development of 
the model. Lotka does not merely stipulate that his model targets predator-prey relationships. 
Instead, he builds this ability into the model during the development of the general equation 
and further constructs this ability in his application of the question to specific targets. In so 
doing, he partially constructs the representational nature of the model—he licenses it as a 
representation through activities in accord with the broader practice. 
 The Lotka-Volterra model’s history since its initial development is long and complex. 
As described by Alan Berryman (1992), one development was a shift in the 1940s to the use 
of a logistic formulation which allowed for attention to be placed on predator-prey ratios 
rather than products. Another development, which occurred around the same time, was the 
use of a predator functional response which introduced a nonlinear rate of death for the prey. 
These developments license new representational targets by expanding and altering the 
model to make it responsive to different theoretical or empirical aims, by removing 
idealizations, or otherwise by allowing for different theoretical conclusions. Many other 
variations of the Lotka-Volterra model exist, licensed by similar developments. Additionally, 
the original formulation of the model is still used in introductory textbooks on ecology (see, 
e.g. Cain, Bowman, and Hacker 2008). The representational nature of the model in each of 
these cases is partially established by these features of the model which stand independent of 
any mental states of scientists and students alike. In short, the constitution of the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model relies deeply upon these historical 
features of licensing as understood by the broader scientific community.  
 
 
Let me briefly underscore the importance of these activities of licensing to the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model by imagining a scenario in which these 
features are absent. Suppose that Volterra and Lotka had proceeded differently. Suppose that 
they began, for no particular reason, by drawing a five-pointed star and stipulated that it 
represented predator-prey relations. What is the status of this star, qua representation? It is 
not as if the star really is a scientific representation of predator-prey relations albeit a bad 
representation (because it does a poor job of meeting certain pragmatic constraints). Rather, 
the star plainly fails to be a scientific representation at all. Scientific representations are 
constructed to assist in answering certain questions, explaining certain phenomena, 
understanding certain target systems. It is through licensing that scientists build into the 
vehicle the features capable of achieving these aims. A vehicle without licensing does not 
have this ability and so it is not just a bad representation. It is not a representation at all. 
Indeed, a discussion of the representational nature of vehicles which lack these features is 
either infelicitous or involves an equivocation of the word ‘representation.’ A view of 
scientific representation which equally counts both the star and the Lotka-Volterra model as 
full scientific representations, even if it specifies one as good and one as bad, underestimates 
the role of these historical features of the model. They are not external to the representational 
nature of the vehicle, but are themselves an essential constitutive feature of this 
representational nature: without these features, the vehicle is not a scientific representation at 
all.  
5. The Special Problem of Scientific Representation  
 
 
If I am right that licensing is a necessary constitutive feature of scientific representation 
which explains its communal nature, then contrary to Callender and Cohen’s suggestion, we 
cannot pull the question of the constitution of representation away from questions of practice. 
A scientific object represents its target not (only) because there is some stipulation and 
pragmatic constraint, but also in virtue of licensing: the context in which it was created, the 
application of theoretical and empirical constraints, the awareness of and management of 
idealizations, and the history of its reception and use. Accounting for whether and how a 
scientific object represents its target will always require reference to these features which 
partially establish the representational nature.  Thus, there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
I should note that I am not here arguing for a stronger counter claim to Callender and 
Cohen which says that accounts of the representational nature of mental states are without 
any value to the constitution question of scientific representation. But my argument does 
indicate that an account of the representational nature of mental states alone is insufficient to 
account for scientific representation. Even if tomorrow we had a solid, universally accepted 
account of the representational nature of mental states, we would not yet have a complete 
account of scientific representation. We would still need an account of the deep reliance that 
it has upon the practice in which it is embedded. Thus, while our discussion of the 
constitution of scientific representation might include reference to the representational nature 
of mental states, it must also include reference to what I have described here as the licensing 
by the practice.  
 
 
A different concern is that the use of the word ‘special’ is a bit deceptive. What I have 
identified here as the ‘special’ problem of scientific representation turns out to be a common 
feature of representation across disciplines, since, for example, I have suggested that it holds 
of artistic representation as well. While it is true that, according to my argument, an account 
of artistic representation will likely take account of licensing as well, it does not indicate that 
it is the same type of licensing in both practices. Indeed, given the unique aims that mark off 
scientific practice, its licensing can reasonably be expected to be correspondingly unique. 
That is to say that understanding, knowing, or explaining the empirical world are special 
aims, and therefore subject to special sorts of licensing. Scientific representation remains 
special because these features merit special attention.  
We might also wonder whether it is right to continue to discuss scientific representation 
as a whole. If understanding representation in science requires in part that we understand the 
way in which scientists of a practice develop, utilize, and adapt these representational 
devices, then it is at least possible that these activities will be different within different 
domains. For example, the licensure of representations in physics might be rather different 
from that of economics. My suspicion is that, given the common broad scale aims of the 
various domains, we can still say some general things about representation in science as a 
whole.  Nonetheless, we would do well to pay attention to representation as it occurs in these 
more localized contexts. Moving forward from this conclusion to develop further insights 
about the nature of scientific representation will involve analyzing specific representational 
objects or strategies as they occur in scientific practice, perhaps taking hints and clues from 
 
 
in-the-field investigations like those conducted by sociologists of science, e.g. those in Lynch 
and Woolgar (1990), Latour (1999), and Coopmans et al. (2014).  
6. Conclusion 
Though Callender and Cohen’s view remains a formidable approach to the constitution 
question of scientific representation, I have endeavored in this paper to show why their 
account is insufficient, and thus why this question merits continued attention by philosophers 
of science. Representation in science is deeply tied up with the practice in which it is 
embedded. The communal nature of scientific representation can be seen in the way that 
science, as a practice, partially constructs its representations through the activities of 
licensing. The licensing is not the pragmatic limitation of some already existing 
representations, but is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Any 
account of what it is for a scientific object to represent its target will necessarily involve 
reference to licensing. Thus, there is a special problem of scientific representation.  
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